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ER-464-a

MAY 7 1948

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MEMORANDUM FOR :

SUBJECT: SANACC 396 and Attachments.

1. The following are the comments on SANACC 396 of CIA.

2. We feel that the evacuation of key foreign personnel from enemy-controlled areas is, within limits, a desirable program. However, we also feel the practical factors have not been fully considered in the paper forming the basis for SANACC 396. We would like, therefore, to present what we feel are the major objections to the proposed plan from a practical and operational point of view. The objections stated herewith will apply to the Phases in the proposed plan.

PHASE 1 — Delegation of responsibility:

This phase envisages the formation of an executive planning staff utilizing part-time personnel. This is inefficient and impracticable. The program is based on an assumption of a state of war and must be considered, therefore, as fundamentally a military operation properly coming under the province of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The responsibility for planning and implementation should be under the JCS from its earliest stages and should not be delegated to any other Agency or Group. Responsible individuals in the fields of science and industry should properly be utilized as consultants but the project must remain in the hands of the JCS.

PHASE 2 — Selection of persons to be evacuated (Targets):

There is no general objection to the discussion under PHASE 2. However, that statement — "No person abandoned to Soviet pleasure can be counted as being available later for wartime assistance ..." is subject to disagreement. It is among this very group that we may expect the maximum in the way of valuable underground leadership and activity. And a consideration of the plan must balance our intelligence and field operational requirements against our scientific and industrial requirements.

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The discussion under PHASE 3 is pertinent to the implementation of any plan selected except as to the question of informing friendly foreign governments of the operation. This will be considered in further details under the statement of our alternate plan.

PHASE 4 — Liaison:

Drafting and execution of the plan will require the cooperative assistance of all agencies. We feel, however, that the final target list must be prepared from the lists compiled by all interested government agencies, and not by suggestions from individuals. We further feel that no plan for the project is capable of execution without the wholehearted support and collaboration of the friendly foreign governments concerned.

PHASE 5 — Partial Implementation before E-Day:

The discussion under PHASE 5 high-lights several objections to the proposed plan from a practical point of view.

a. It is impractical to assume that we can divorce any part of our small occupational force, its equipment, or its transportation, from its primary mission of delaying the enemy.

b. The introduction of carefully screened officers into foreign areas for the purpose of providing an "on the ground" operations staff is feasible if done clandestinely. However, this infers that we are able to determine E-Day rather specifically. Their presence for a longer period of time than necessary for complete orientation will certainly call attention to their activities.

c. The pooling of equipment and transport in various areas for immediate use is idealistic. Transport in these areas is overloaded by current needs. The introduction, from the United States or occupied areas, of service type transport would be immediately noted by enemy agents and, in any event, must be done with the full knowledge and cooperation of the nation concerned.

PHASE 6 — Execution:

Under the wartime conditions the plan must be executed without regard to its appearance to the enemy. The problem is to get the targets out of their country and to the United States.

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PHASE 7 - Reception in the United States:

This problem again presents practical considerations. Regardless of the number of target individuals selected for evacuation, consideration must be given to the fact that plans must be made for the reception of at least four (4) times the target number (conservatively). For there is little use in trying to evacuate key individuals without also providing for the evacuation of their families.

The introduction of foreigners in mass will require a change in many of our existing laws and regulations. While it may be expected that Congress will, on the outbreak of war, quickly provide for such changes in our laws, this is a matter which must be arranged prior to the evacuation. We must realize that many desirable evacuees will be most uncooperative if they are not fully assured of their status prior to their evacuation.

3. We respectfully suggest that any governmental facilities available in foreign countries at the outbreak of war be first utilized in the evacuation of American citizens.

Assured


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